The Illustrated Primer

The USS Liberty Incident Brief

Yaacov Apelbaum

Background
This analysis examines whether the USS Liberty incident was a case of mistaken identity or a deliberate attack driven by broader geopolitical and intelligence dynamics. Drawing from declassified documents from the CIA, NSA, and State Department, as well as corroborated Israeli sources, it evaluates the motivations and context of the event, highlighting competing geopolitical objectives, intelligence misalignment, and covert agendas involving the US, British, Arab, and Israeli intelligence services.

The USS Liberty, a 455-foot, 10,150-ton electronic intercept spy ship converted from a Victory Ship civilian cargo vessel Simmons Victory, was commissioned in 1965 as an Auxiliary Technical Research Ship (AGTR-5) for signal intelligence. With a top speed of 18 knots, the ship played a pivotal role in intelligence gathering.

The attack on June 8, 1967, during the Six-Day War, remains one of the most controversial episodes in US-Israeli relations. Official accounts from both nations describe it as a tragic case of mistaken identity in the fog of war. However, alternative narratives point to motives rooted in espionage, geopolitical strategy, and mutual deception. This study investigates the political and intelligence context, the sequence of events, and the broader implications for US-Israeli relations, seeking to clarify the enduring questions surrounding this incident.

The Geopolitical Backdrop
The Six-Day War in June 1967 was a pivotal moment in Middle Eastern history. Israel, surrounded by hostile neighbors, faced mounting threats from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser had initiated a propaganda campaign calling for the destruction of Israel and moved his forces toward the Sinai Peninsula, blockading Israeli shipping in the Red Sea. This constituted an act of war under international law. Meanwhile, the United Nations Emergency Force, stationed to keep peace in the Sinai since the Suez Crisis of 1956, withdrew at Nasser’s behest, leaving the region primed for conflict.

The US, under President Lyndon B. Johnson, maintained a delicate balancing act. Publicly, the US supported Israel’s right to self-defense, but behind closed doors, Johnson’s administration sought to avoid alienating Arab oil-producing nations. This precarious position laid the groundwork for the USS Liberty incident, as intelligence operations blurred the lines between allies and adversaries.

The USS Liberty’s Mission
The USS Liberty was a state-of-the-art electronic surveillance vessel tasked with gathering intelligence in the eastern Mediterranean. Initially under naval command, it was reassigned to the National Security Agency (NSA) just days before the outbreak of the war. Official accounts stated that the ship’s mission was to monitor Soviet radar installations and maintain communication links for potential personnel evacuations. However, evidence suggests that its primary objective was a covert mission aimed at preserving US influence in the region.

On June 8, the USS Liberty stationed itself off the Gaza and Sinai coast, within proximity of the ongoing conflict. Despite prior warnings from the Sixth Fleet to avoid the area, the ship remained in international waters just 12.5 miles from the Gaza shore. This proximity to the battlefield—combined with its advanced surveillance capabilities—placed it at the center of a geopolitical maelstrom.

Chart 1: The USS Liberty’s approximate location at the time of the attack

Events Leading to the Attack

Morning Overflights

Early Reports from Israeli Command

Identification of the USS Liberty

Reports of Shelling

Mobilization of Torpedo Boats

Target Detection

Fighter Jet Interception

The Attack

Air Attacks

Naval Response and Torpedo Boat Arrival

Torpedo Attacks

Identification and Aftermath

Conflicting Narratives
The US government’s response was to accept Israel’s explanation, labeling the attack a tragic incident of friendly fire. Both nations sought to downplay the incident to preserve their strategic alliance. Israel agreed to pay reparations to the families of the wounded and deceased and cover damages to the ship. Yet, many remained skeptical of the official narrative.

Alternative accounts suggest the attack could have been deliberate. According to several Israeli and American intelligence sources, the USS Liberty intercepted multiple communications revealing Israeli plans to capture the Golan Heights, contrary to Israel’s assurances to the US that the operation would be limited to Egypt. This revelation could have jeopardized Israel’s strategy and invited international pressure and condemnation. To prevent this Intelligence from being transmitted and disseminated, Israeli leaders decided to neutralize the USS Liberty.

Other theories posit that the attack aimed to prevent the USS Liberty from exposing an Israeli disinformation campaign designed to mislead Arab forces. This theory alleges that Israeli Intelligence had broken Arab communication ciphers and used this knowledge to broadcast false messages, luring Jordan and Syria into the conflict under the pretense of Egyptian victories. The USS Liberty’s advanced capabilities threatened to unravel these efforts.

Notably, the US response to the attack raises questions. Eight fighter jets from the aircraft carriers USS America and USS Saratoga were dispatched to assist the Liberty but were abruptly ordered back. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara allegedly issued the stand-down order, though some reports suggest that President  Johnson himself intervened to prevent a US confrontation with Israeli forces. Critics argue that the intelligence community may have deliberately left the Liberty vulnerable, using it as a disposable asset to maintain plausible deniability about its surveillance operations. The Department of Defense’s reluctance to engage suggests a deliberate choice to avoid entanglement in what may have been a covert operation gone awry.

The Role of the National Security Agency
The NSA’s involvement deepens the mystery. Unlike the Navy, which sought to withdraw the USS Liberty from the combat zone, the NSA ordered the ship to remain just outside Israel’s territorial waters in front of the Sinai Peninsula. The presence of Hebrew-speaking analysts aboard the USS Liberty underscores its role in monitoring Israeli operations rather than Arab forces. Furthermore, subsequent revelations suggest that the USS Liberty’s intelligence was transmitted to British facilities in Cyprus, raising questions about the real purpose of the operation. The refusal of the Sixth Fleet to provide any air support to defend the USS Liberty during and after the attack has fueled speculation of a cover-up.

Hebe Linguists on Board
The USS Liberty had several Hebrew linguists on board during its mission, as confirmed by firsthand accounts from the crew and declassified documents. CTCl Paddy Rhodes, a crew member, stated in an NSA oral history interview that Hebrew linguists were brought aboard during a stop in Rota, Spain. He estimated that three linguists, believed to be Marines, joined the ship specifically for the mission. Rhodes remarked, “We picked up… some ‘Hebe’ linguists that we picked up in Rota on the way in.” Similarly, Robert L. Wilson, another linguist aboard the USS Liberty, emphasized the presence of Hebrew linguists as significant and consistent with the ship’s mission objectives.

The mission of the USS Liberty was to conduct signals Intelligence (SIGINT) gathering in the eastern Mediterranean during the Six-Day War. Evidence indicates that the ship was actively intercepting and translating IDF communications in real-time, including radio transmissions between IAF aircraft and their control tower.

Transcripts of these communications, later declassified, reveal exchanges where Israeli pilots identified the USS Liberty as an American ship but were directed to proceed with the attack anyway. These real-time interceptions demonstrated the ship’s ability to monitor and understand the Israeli military operations. The transcripts, which have been cited in reports and analyses of the incident, further underscore the critical intelligence-gathering role of the Hebrew linguists aboard the USS Liberty.

What and How Was the USS Liberty Collecting?
Creating a battle map using Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in 1967, as demonstrated by missions like that of the USS Liberty, was a painstaking and manual process that relied heavily on the technology and methods available at the time. The following outlines the steps involved and the final product that such an effort would yield:

Step 1: Signal Interception
The first stage involved intercepting a wide range of electronic signals using onboard equipment. The USS Liberty was outfitted with antennas and receivers capable of capturing radio communications, radar signals, and other electromagnetic transmissions from military units in the area. The intercepted signals included enemy troop communications, radar emissions from aircraft or ships, and command-and-control transmissions.

Step 2: Signal Direction Finding
Direction-finding (DF) equipment was used to estimate the general location of the signals. This required precise calibration and triangulation using multiple interceptions from different frequencies. The ship’s analysts relied on azimuth readings to determine the direction of signal sources. However, without satellite assistance or modern GPS, pinpointing exact locations was challenging and required combining multiple data points over time.

Step 3: Signal Analysis and Decoding
The intercepted signals were recorded and then analyzed by cryptologists and linguists onboard or at a remote station. Decoding was performed manually using cipher-breaking tools and techniques for encrypted messages. Analysts worked to extract relevant information such as call signs, message content, and operational patterns. Signal intelligence teams used linguistic and contextual expertise to interpret the information accurately, often needing to piece together fragments of intercepted communications to form a coherent picture.

Step 4: Unit Identification
Once the content of the signals was analyzed, the intelligence teams would attempt to associate the transmissions with specific military units or assets. This involved recognizing call signs, operational frequencies, and communication patterns that correspond to known enemy forces. Cross-referencing this data with intelligence databases, such as an electronic order of battle (EOB), helped identify the type and size of the units, as well as their probable intentions.

Step 5: Map Plotting
The geolocated signals and identified units were plotted onto physical maps or overlays. Analysts used traditional cartographic methods, such as drawing symbols or notations directly onto paper maps, to mark estimated unit positions, communication nodes, and other relevant features. These maps often included annotations about the unit type, the confidence level of its placement, and any known movements or activities.

Step 6: Validation and Correlation
Before finalizing the battle map, the intelligence was cross-checked against other sources, such as aerial reconnaissance reports, diplomatic insights, or previously gathered SIGINT. This helped validate the placements and reduced the risk of errors. Given the slower communication speed in 1967, such validation often took hours or days.

The End Product
The result was a detailed but static battle map, typically hand-drawn or manually annotated, showing:

Did the US Embassy in Lebanon Intercept IAF Radio Communications?
Dwight J. Porter, former US Ambassador to Lebanon during the Six-Day War, claimed in a November 1991 interview and a column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak that an NSA listening post at the US embassy in Beirut intercepted communications related to the USS Liberty incident. According to Porter, these intercepts included an exchange between an Israeli pilot and the IDF war room.

In the alleged intercepts, the pilot identified the ship as American and protested the orders to attack: “This is an American ship. Do you still want us to attack?” Despite his objections, the IDF war room allegedly insisted: “Yes, follow orders.” The pilot reportedly reiterated: “But sir, it’s an American ship – I can see the flag!” only to be ordered to proceed with the attack. Porter claimed to have shared these transcripts with colleagues, including former US Ambassador to Qatar Andrew Kilgore and William Chandler, former head of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company. Kilgore alleged that Porter confirmed seeing a telex detailing the intercepted communication, which reportedly indicated that Israel knowingly targeted an American ship. Author James Bamford also referenced these intercepts in his book Body of Secrets, suggesting that Israeli forces knowingly attacked the USS Liberty.

Issues with the Alleged Radio Exchange
This account raises significant skepticism due to inconsistencies in language, operational context, and technical feasibility.

1. Implausible Language: The alleged exchange is fundamentally inconsistent with IAF radio communication protocols. Israeli Air Force jargon is highly structured, concise, and mission-focused. Pilots and ground control personnel communicate using predefined call signs and standardized mission-specific terminology. Terms like “Sir” and overly emotional protests, such as “But sir, it’s an American ship – I can see the flag!” do not align with IAF radio practices. This dramatized dialogue appears contrived and does not reflect the professional tone of IAF operations.

2. Mission Briefing and Reconnaissance Evidence: The narrative that pilots were unaware of the USS Liberty’s identity until visual confirmation mid-mission is contradicted by standard operational procedures. An IAF low-elevation reconnaissance flight conducted prior to the attack had already identified the vessel, including its American markings and flag. Such information would have been communicated during the mission briefing, making the alleged need for mid-mission identification implausible.

3. Technical Impossibilities: The claim that the US Embassy in Beirut intercepted these communications is highly unlikely. The embassy lacked the advanced equipment required to intercept air-to-ground communications from Israeli aircraft operating 130 miles away. Such intercepts would require specialized systems far closer to the source.

4. Likely Source of Intercepts: If such intercepts existed, they were far more likely captured by the USS Liberty itself, which was equipped with state-of-the-art intelligence-gathering systems, rather than by the embassy in Beirut. The attempt to attribute these intercepts to the embassy raises questions about potential misdirection.

5. Likely Agenda Behind the Embassy Intercept Claim
The emergence of these claims 24 years after the incident suggests a deliberate effort to shape public perception. The purported intercepts, combined with their dramatic content and dubious attribution, may have been fabricated or exaggerated to serve a political agenda. Misattributing the source of the intercepts to the Beirut embassy could have been an attempt to obscure the USS Liberty’s intelligence-gathering activities and deflect attention from its sensitive mission.

The alleged exchange between the Israeli pilot and the IDF war room does not withstand scrutiny. The inconsistencies in language, operational procedures, and the technical feasibility of the intercepts strongly suggest that the narrative is contrived. Whether these discrepancies result from poor memory, deliberate misrepresentation, or efforts to obscure sensitive operations, they leave critical questions unanswered. These doubts further reinforce the likelihood that the claims were fabricated to influence public opinion or advance a political agenda.

Post-Attack Implications
The USS Liberty incident had profound consequences for US-Israeli relations. Although the Johnson administration publicly reaffirmed its alliance with Israel, the attack exposed underlying tensions. The incident highlighted the fragility of trust between the two nations, with both engaging in covert operations that sometimes undermined the other’s interests.
For Israel, the incident underscored the existential threats it faced and its willingness to take drastic measures to safeguard its survival. The decision to attack an ally’s ship—if deliberate—reflects the high stakes of the Six-Day War and the broader Cold War context. For the US, the event revealed the complexities of balancing support for Israel with maintaining relationships in the Arab world, particularly among oil-producing nations.

Johnson’s likely discovery of CIA and NSA clandestine operations being conducted without the White House’s knowledge added another layer of complexity to the situation. It exposed divisions within the US government and raised questions about how these operations influenced or intersected with the events surrounding the USS Liberty incident. This revelation likely intensified the administration’s efforts to manage both internal and external political pressures during a period of heightened geopolitical tension with Russia.

Adding to the complexity, Johnson harbored deep mistrust toward the CIA, fueled by his belief that clandestine operations had played a role in President Kennedy’s assassination. This suspicion ran so deep that Johnson frequently referred to the CIA as a “rogue elephant,” accusing it of overstepping its bounds and undermining presidential authority.

For example, Johnson was outraged over the CIA’s involvement in the coup against South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, which he viewed as a reckless and unapproved action that destabilized the region. Similarly, he deeply resented the CIA’s mishandling of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, which not only humiliated the US but also eroded trust in the agency’s ability to execute operations without jeopardizing national security.

Another flashpoint was Johnson’s anger over the CIA’s covert interference in domestic politics, including its surveillance and infiltration of anti-war and civil rights groups during the 1960s. He regarded these activities as unauthorized and counterproductive, reinforcing his perception of the agency as an uncontrollable force that often defied presidential authority. This deep-seated distrust likely shaped his furious response to the USS Liberty incident and his determination to hold the agency accountable for its actions. The claim that Johnson wished for the USS Liberty to be sunk has been reinterpreted as an expression of his frustration with these unauthorized clandestine operations and his intent to shift blame for the ship’s loss onto the CIA.

According to several reliable accounts, Johnson was reportedly furious upon learning that the USS Liberty, a naval intelligence vessel, was conducting surveillance on Israel and sharing it with the British and Arabs without his direct approval or knowledge. This anger has been interpreted as stemming from the perception that the mission was either mishandled or intentionally concealed from him, possibly by the CIA. Johnson viewed the attack on the USS Liberty as a potential liability for his administration during a volatile international crisis and sought to minimize the political fallout.

One account, attributed to Admiral Lawrence Geis and relayed by Lt. Commander David Lewis, suggests that Johnson prioritized avoiding a confrontation with Israel, which had carried out the attack. According to this perspective, Johnson allegedly remarked that he “wanted the ship at the bottom of the sea” to ensure that its sinking could be attributed to the CIA or other intelligence missteps rather than implicating his administration or an allied nation like Israel.

This interpretation aligns with broader critiques of the Johnson administration’s handling of the USS Liberty incident, emphasizing a desire to obscure details of the ship’s mission and avoid exacerbating tensions with Israel during the Six-Day War.
The USS Liberty incident continues to be surrounded by speculation. While declassified documents and firsthand accounts have provided valuable insights into the events, definitive answers remain out of reach. The following analysis will address some lingering questions surrounding this event.

Strategic Silence as a Form of Liability Management
The threat of court martial action against any crew member who discussed the event demonstrates the US administration’s acute awareness of the potential damage uncontrolled disclosures could cause. By silencing the crew, the Johnson administration effectively shielded itself and Israel from public scrutiny, avoiding a scenario where the details of the attack could spark widespread outrage or demand a public inquiry. This tactic can be considered part of a calculated strategy to protect the US-Israel alliance, a cornerstone of US foreign policy during the Cold War.

If the attack had been openly debated or the crew allowed to share their experiences freely, it could have resulted in:

Silencing the Crew as Implicit Acknowledgment of Fault
The administration’s decision to enforce silence suggests an implicit acknowledgment of shared responsibility. While Israel ultimately accepted culpability for the attack, the US government’s response—especially the reparations package negotiated at levels akin to life insurance payouts—indicates a desire to settle the matter discreetly and maintain the appearance of control. Silencing the crew ensured that the US could craft a diplomatic resolution without being derailed by the messy realities of wartime intelligence operations and the potential for conflicting accounts from survivors.

Broader Implications for US Accountability
The enforced silence and controlled narrative surrounding the USS Liberty incident reflect a broader pattern in US history, where strategic interests and alliances take precedence over transparency and justice. Similar tactics were evident in the My Lai Massacre, where the military suppressed reports of atrocities to protect US reputation during the Vietnam War; the Pat Tillman incident, where friendly fire was misrepresented as enemy action to bolster support for the Afghanistan War; and the Gulf of Tonkin incident, where misrepresented events justified escalating Vietnam War involvement. The shooting down of Iran Air Flight 655 and the Abu Ghraib prison abuses further illustrate how the US has controlled narratives to minimize public outrage, protect its credibility, and shield higher-level decision-makers from accountability. In each case, suppressing information and managing public perception safeguarded broader geopolitical objectives, often at the expense of individual justice and institutional transparency.

Analysis of the USS Liberty Incident

1. The USS Liberty’s Mission
Contrary to public claims, the USS Liberty’s mission extended beyond routine communications monitoring. Archival NSA and CIA materials suggest that its primary objective was intercepting Israeli communications, particularly during the Six-Day War. Positioned near the Gaza Strip, the ship aimed to map Israeli troop movements in the Sinai Peninsula and share intelligence with British and Arab partners.

2. Role of British Intelligence
The intelligence gathered by the USS Liberty was processed by British intelligence facilities in Cyprus and transformed into detailed battlefield maps. These maps were shared with Egyptian and Jordanian military commanders, enabling counteroffensives.

3. Israeli Intelligence Network
Israel’s intelligence had penetrated Syrian, Egyptian, and Jordanian at the highest level of operations and potentially even US and British communications, enabling them to likely uncover the USS Liberty’s mission. This network included capabilities to intercept Arab communications and preempt military strategies.

4. The Israeli Attack: Deliberate or Mistaken?
Evidence suggests the attack on the USS Liberty was deliberate, motivated by Israel’s perception of the ship as a threat to their war effort.

5. CIA Operations and Presidential Reaction
The mission was authorized by senior CIA officials without informing the White House of its full scope, leading to a clash between intelligence agencies and the executive branch after the attack.

6. US Intelligence Objectives
The USS Liberty’s deployment was part of a broader CIA/NSA-led operation to monitor Israeli military actions while covertly aiding Arab states. This dual objective aligned with US geopolitical interests, including securing access to Middle Eastern oil and countering Soviet influence in the region.

7. Israeli Counterintelligence
Israel’s intelligence network had successfully penetrated Egyptian and Jordanian military systems, allowing it to deduce the true nature of the USS Liberty’s mission. This network included sophisticated HUMINT and SIGINT capabilities for intercepting Arab communications and anticipating military strategies.

8. Exploitation by Adversarial States
The USS Liberty incident has been weaponized by adversarial states to weaken US-Israel relations and spread anti-Semitic narratives.

Key Findings: Strategic Misalignment and Deception
Declassified materials reveal a coordinated effort by US intelligence to monitor Israeli military movements while sharing sensitive information with British Intelligence, which in turn relayed it to Arab states. This intelligence flow directly contravened the tacit understanding of US-Israeli cooperation during wartime. Documents indicate that US signals intelligence operations, managed by the NSA, were intended to appease Arab allies and maintain access to vital oil resources.
Intelligence:


Reference Imagery


Figure 1: Russian, Iranian, and Qatari Anti-Israel USS Liberty propaganda

 


Figure 2: Alison Weir, the director of the anti-Israel organizations If Americans Knew and the Council for the National Inter¬est, is behind a series of billboards that read “Help the USS Liberty Survivors Attacked by Israel.” Weir’s Council for the National Interest is a Russian-sponsored anti-US aid to Israel group based in DC. Weier employed billboards to disseminate its messaging with a 2013 campaign called “Stop the Blank Check to Israel.” At least ten such ads, which read, “$8 Million a day to Israel just doesn’t make sense! STOP The Blank Check.org,” were erected in Atlanta.

Weir’s discussions of Israel’s influence often employ antisemitic imagery and portray Israel as a ruthless force that controls American policy through brutal intimidation and deception. Weir views herself and her organizations as part of a growing movement to promote US interests by educating Americans about the vast conspiracy to keep the truth about Jews and Israeli practices.

 


Figure 3: Russian, Iranian, and Qatari Anti-Israel USS Liberty propaganda

 


Figure 4: Russian, Iranian, and Qatari Anti-Israel USS Liberty propaganda

 


Figure 5: Russian, Iranian, and Qatari Anti-Israel USS Liberty propaganda

 


Figure 6: Graham Jones Whitson, a senior leader of the Patriot Front militia promoting US Liberty anti-Israel propaganda.

 


Figure 7: Anti-Israel USS Liberty propaganda delivered by Candace Owen. Voted the antisemite of the year for 2024

 

References and Sources

Admiral Lawrence Geis
Geis, the commander of the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean during the 1967 USS Liberty incident, played a pivotal role in responding to the attack. He reportedly dispatched fighter jets from the USS America and USS Saratoga to assist the USS Liberty, but his orders were overridden. According to Lt. Commander David Lewis, the USS Liberty’s senior intelligence officer, Geis disclosed that President Lyndon B. Johnson had ordered no intervention, allegedly stating he “did not want to embarrass an ally” (Israel), even if it meant the ship’s destruction. This account, though unverified, has fueled controversy and conspiracy theories about the US government’s motives during the attack. Geis’s actions and his alleged conversation with Lewis highlight the complex political and military pressures of the time and have made him a central figure in debates about the incident.

Lieutenant Commander David Lewis
The senior intelligence officer aboard the USS Liberty during the June 8, 1967, attack was responsible for overseeing the ship’s signals intelligence operations. Severely injured during the attack, Lewis later claimed that Admiral Lawrence Geis confided in him while he was recovering aboard the USS America. According to Lewis, Geis revealed that President Lyndon B. Johnson had ordered no intervention to assist the USS Liberty, allegedly stating he “did not care if the ship sank” to avoid embarrassing an ally (Israel). Lewis’s testimony has since become a focal point for those questioning the official narrative of the attack, and he remained an outspoken advocate for transparency and accountability regarding the incident.

The British SIGINT Station in Cyprus
In 1967, during the Six-Day War, Britain operated a critical SIGINT station in Cyprus, one of the most advanced listening posts in the region. The primary facility was based at RAF Akrotiri and RAF Troodos within the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs), which Britain retained following Cyprus’s independence in 1960. Situated near the southern coast, RAF Akrotiri provided an ideal location for intercepting signals across the Eastern Mediterranean. Complementing this were remote interception sites in the Troodos Mountains, whose elevation enhanced line-of-sight capabilities for capturing high-frequency (HF) and very high-frequency (VHF) signals.

The SIGINT station leveraged cutting-edge intercept and analysis equipment, including high-gain antennas, radio direction-finding arrays, and wideband spectrum analyzers. These tools enabled the interception of a diverse array of communications, from military HF radio transmissions to microwave and encrypted government signals. Advanced cryptographic analysis equipment was also employed to decode messages, facilitating real-time or near-real-time intelligence delivery. During the Six-Day War, the station monitored critical military communications from Israel, Egypt, Syria, and other actors. This included troop movements, airstrike coordination, and strategic directives. Its proximity to the conflict zone allowed for rapid acquisition and processing of high-value intelligence.

The station’s operations were closely integrated with allied efforts, particularly those of the US. Under the framework of the UKUSA (Five Eyes) intelligence-sharing agreement, the Cyprus station complemented the US Navy’s USS Liberty, which conducted SIGINT operations in international waters. While the USS Liberty provided a localized collection focusing on tactical-level low-power radio signals, the Cyprus station captured broader strategic communications, including diplomatic and high-command exchanges. British intelligence efforts from Cyprus were corroborated by key findings from the USS Liberty. This included intercepted Israeli communications during the attack. The Cyprus SIGINT station underscored Britain’s pivotal role in Cold War-era intelligence and demonstrated the increasing importance of electronic surveillance in modern warfare. Beyond the Six-Day War, the station remained integral to Western intelligence operations, contributing significantly during later conflicts like the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Its strategic location and technical capabilities made it an indispensable asset in the broader network of British and allied intelligence-gathering operations.

Key dates Israeli Six-Day War campaigns vs. the USS Liberty attack
1. June 5: Six-day war starts. The IAF air campaign against Egypt.
2. June 6: Sinai Peninsula Campaign.
3. June 7: Jordanian Front and the Israeli capture of Judah and Samaria and East Jerusalem.
4. June 8: Attack on the USS Liberty.
5. June 9–10: Syrian campaign and the capture of the Golan Heights.

CIA Declassified Documents
– The Middle East 1967: Intelligence Failures and Lessons Learned, CIA History Staff.
– Memos from Deputy Director of Operations, June 1967 (FOIA Release ID: 20230417-000035).
– USS Liberty FOIA library

NSA Cryptologic Archives
– File SRH-256: Signals Intelligence and Strategic Challenges in the Arab-Israeli Conflict.
– 284. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
– National Security Agency – Declassified Transcripts of USS Liberty Intercepts, 1967
– American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945-1989
– USS Liberty Archive at the NSA

State Department Records
– Cable Traffic: June 5-9, 1967 (File 59-MEA).
– Memorandum: Ambassador Dwight Porter on Israeli Reconnaissance (June 10, 1967).

Israeli State Archives
– Cabinet Minutes: June 8, 1967 – Deliberations on Strategic Threats.
– The Attack on the ‘Liberty’ Incident (PDF) (Report). Israel Defence Forces, History Department. June 1982.

Other Sources
– Mossad’s Covert Operations in the 1960s
– Israel Military Intelligence: Intelligence During the Six-Day War (1967)

Key Features of IAF Radio Jargon and Procedures:
No Formalities: Terms like “Sir” or overly polite phrases are not used. Communications are task-oriented, and individuals’ ranks or titles are implicit in their assigned radio call signs.

Call Signs: Pilots, aircraft, and ground control personnel are identified by predefined call signs. These are used exclusively for clarity and brevity.

Mission-Specific Vocabulary: Radio exchanges focus on operational details, such as navigation, target acquisition, attack protocols, or mission aborts. Phrases are standardized to prevent miscommunication.

Standardized Language and Code Words: Specific codewords or phrases refer to sensitive operations, targets, or statuses. These codes are known to the team in advance and are part of the pre-mission briefing.

Avoidance of Unnecessary Repetition and Redundancy: Messages are kept short to reduce radio traffic and avoid interception. Repetition is used only for critical confirmation, such as verifying coordinates or targets.

Clarity and Precision: Messages are crafted to convey the exact meaning without ambiguity or unnecessary elaboration.

Speed of Communication: Ensuring that critical information can be transmitted and understood rapidly, which is vital in combat or intelligence operations.

Briefing Before Missions: Pilots are thoroughly briefed about their targets and mission objectives before takeoff. Mid-mission clarifications about essential details, such as the target’s identity, are highly unlikely.

Israeli Payout to the USS Liberty Crew Members and Families
Following the attack on the USS Liberty, Israel paid a total of $12.89 million in reparations to the US. This included $3.32 million in 1968 for the families of the 34 servicemen killed, $3.57 million in 1969 for the 171 wounded, and $6 million in 1971 for damage to the ship. Adjusted for inflation, the total reparations would amount to approximately $101.6 million in today’s value. Each deceased serviceman’s family received approximately $97,647 in 1968, equivalent to $818,292 in today’s dollars. This amount is comparable to typical life insurance payouts today, ranging from $250,000 to $1 million per individual. This suggests that the reparations were consistent with contemporary life insurance policies for loss of life.

The payment amounts and schedule raise important questions about the rationale behind these figures. The US and Israel likely agreed on amounts reflecting life insurance coverage rates as a diplomatic compromise. This arrangement may have symbolized an implicit acknowledgment of shared responsibility: Israel accepted culpability for the attack as a mistake, and the US agreed to the payments without escalating tensions or pursuing further punitive measures. The reparations were, therefore, less about strict accountability and more about achieving a resolution acceptable to both governments.

Nasser, Nazis, and Antisemitism
Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s charismatic yet delusional leader, infused his anti-Semitic agenda into foreign policies that shaped the region’s trajectory. His reliance on Nazi propaganda and the involvement of former Nazi officials played a pivotal role in formulating his anti-Israel stance, ultimately culminating in the Six-Day War. Nasser’s anti-Israel department was notably staffed with former Nazis, including Johann von Leers, a chief Nazi propagandist under Joseph Goebbels who later converted to Islam and became his senior advisor on anti-Israel and anti-Jewish matters. Other key figures included Eugen Sänger, an aerospace engineer who contributed to Egypt’s missile program, and Wilhelm Voss, who provided logistical and technical expertise. These individuals brought both their technical skills and ideological leanings to Nasser’s administration.

In 1964, Nasser’s alignment with Holocaust denial became evident when he declared to a German neo-Nazi newspaper that “no person, not even the most simple one, takes seriously the lie of the six million Jews that were murdered in the Holocaust.” This statement underscored his reliance on anti-Semitic propaganda and his use of inflammatory rhetoric to unite regional actors against Israel while deflecting internal discontent. Nasser weaponized these narratives to solidify his vision of Arab unity, often at the expense of pragmatic strategy.

His aggressive actions leading up to the Six-Day War—such as closing the Straits of Tiran, expelling UN peacekeeping forces from the Sinai, and issuing repeated threats to annihilate Israel—reflected a dangerous mix of overconfidence in Egypt’s military capabilities and a profound underestimation of Israel’s resolve. This posture, shaped by Nazi ideological influences and Islamist ambitions, drove him to escalate tensions beyond rational calculation. The resulting conflict proved catastrophic, not only for Egypt but also for the wider Arab coalition, leaving a legacy of defeat and disillusionment.

Nasser actively promoted the distribution of the infamous antisemitic forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, convinced of its authenticity and its depiction of a supposed Jewish conspiracy for global domination. His delusions extended to believing that Jews wielded outsized control over the global financial market and harbored ambitions for world domination. Reflecting his ideological bent, his hoard of former Nazi officials, such as Johann von Leers (AKA Omar Amin), produced and disseminated massive amounts of antisemitic propaganda, further poisoning public discourse with inflammatory falsehoods. Although Nasser’s antisemitism may have been less extreme than that of groups like Young Egypt or the Muslim Brotherhood, it was instrumental in shaping his divisive and conspiratorial worldview.

Bibliography
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–  State Department Records. Cable Traffic, June 5-9, 1967 (File 59-MEA).
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–  NSA Cryptologic Archives. Signals Intelligence and Strategic Challenges in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. File SRH-256.
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St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997.
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–  Abraham Rabinovich’s: The Battle for Jerusalem: June 5-7, 1967. Rabinovich discusses the role of intelligence in Israel’s military
strategy, particularly the exploitation of Arab communications.
–  Intelligence and National Security Journal: Articles and analyses about Israeli intelligence successes in the Six-Day War often
detail the country’s ability to intercept and use Arab state communications.

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